This is the fourth and the final instalment of Philip Fisher’s “Four Dimensions of Investing” series. The first three were discussed as part of Value Investing Almanack’s special reports (previous three issues). It’s recommended that you read the first three parts before reading this one.
The first three dimensions of conservative investment were essentially about the quality of the business itself. However, a great business becomes a great investment only when it’s acquired at a reasonable price. That means, without considering the price, the conservativeness of an investment process is still questionable. So, price is the fourth dimension of conservative investing.
Now, price alone doesn’t reveal much information. One needs to compare the price to something else to be able to make any sense out of it. That brings us to the price-earnings ratio (P/E).
A stock trading at P/E of 15 means that Mr. Market is willing to pay Rs. 15 for every rupee of earning the business generates. So, a corollary to this statement would be – P/E is roughly the number of years an investor will need to hold the stock to recover his or her original investment in the business. In the above example, it would take 15 years to recoup the initial investment.
P/E multiple is the most popular metric tracked by the investment community and perhaps the most misunderstood one too. The purpose of P/E isn’t just to capture two independent data points – price and earnings – into a single one. Price-earnings ratio is the barometer of Mr. Market’s expectations. In other words, P/E
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multiple depicts the larger financial community’s appraisal of a business’s future prospects.
Fisher writes –
The matter of appraisal is the heart of understanding the seeming vagaries of price-earnings ratios. It should never be forgotten that an appraisal is a subjective matter. It has nothing necessarily to do with what is going on in the real world about us. Rather, it results from what the person doing the appraising believes is going on, no matter how far from the actual facts such a judgment may be. In other words, any individual stock does not rise or fall at any particular moment in time because of what is actually happening or will happen to that company. It rises or falls according to the current consensus of the financial community as to what is happening and will happen regardless of how far off this consensus may be from what is really occurring or will occur.
There are two ways an investor can make money from stocks. One is that the underlying business grows its earnings which translates to a higher price of the stock. Another way is when the investor community changes its view about the stock and re-rates its appraisal of the business. A positive re-rating (P/E expansion) means that Mr. Market is willing to pay more for every rupee of earnings produced by the company. Among these two ways, the former happens at slower pace, however, the latter is what causes the short-term fluctuations in price. Here’s an illustration from Fisher’s book that reveals the dynamics of P/E –
Two years ago company G was considered quite ordinary. It had earned $1 per share and was selling at ten times earnings, or $10. During these last two years most companies in its industry have been showing a downward profit trend. In contrast, a series of brilliant new products, combined with better profit margins on old products, enabled G company to report $1.40 per share last year and $1.82 this year and to give promise of further gains over the next several years. Obviously the actions within the company that produced the sharp contrast between G’s recent results and those of others in the industry could not have started just two years ago but must have been going on for sometime; otherwise the operating economies and the brilliant new products would not have occurred. However, belated recognition (i.e., appraisal) of how well G is qualifying in regard to matters covered in our discussion of the first three dimensions has now caused the price-earnings ratio to rise to 22. When compared with other stocks showing similar above-average business characteristics and comparable growth prospects, this ratio of 22 does not appear at all high. Since 22 times $1.82 is $40, here is a stock that has legitimately gone up 400 hundred percent in two years.
The example above shows the nonlinear relationship between earnings growth and price growth. A 2x growth in earnings usually results in more than two-fold increase in price – 4x in the above example. Increase in earnings causes a P/E expansion which in turn raises the stock price much more than what earnings growth alone would normally mandate. The similar effect works in reverse too. A decrease in earnings can cause the P/E to contract and depress the price much more than warranted by lower earnings alone.
Based on this we can say that the price of every stock is comprised of two elements. One is “fundamental” which is driven by the earnings of the business. The second is “speculative” which is a function of Mr. Market’s expectations about the future growth of the company’s earnings. Over long-term, the price tends to follow the earnings trend. Benjamin Graham called it the weighing machine effect. But in the short term, the price is a slave of P/E fluctuations which Graham attributed as the voting machine effect.
So how should a conservative investor think about P/E while making an investment decision? Fisher gives important clues. He writes –
On the lowest end of the risk scale and most suitable for wise investment is the company that measures quite high in regard to the first three dimensions but currently is appraised by the financial community as less worth, and therefore has a lower price-earnings ratio, than these fundamental facts warrant.
These kind of investment opportunities are rare and available largely during an extended bear market. An investor needs to practice extreme patience to find such bets. The strategy for such opportunities is to maintain a watch list of high-quality businesses and then wait.
Next least risky and usually quite suitable for intelligent investment is the company rating quite high in regard to the first three dimensions and having an image and therefore a price-earnings ratio reasonably in line with these fundamentals. This is because such a company will continue to grow if it truly has these attributes.
This is what Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger call – buying a great business at a fair price. These kinds of opportunities are less rare compared to the first one. The long term returns in such businesses come largely because of consistent growth in profits over multiple decades.
Next least risky and, in my opinion, usually suitable for retention by conservative investors who own them but not for fresh purchase with new funds are companies that are equally strong in regards to the first three dimensions but, because these qualities have become almost legendary in the financial community, have an appraisal or price-earnings ratio higher than is warranted by even the strong fundamentals.
As Fisher argues, such businesses aren’t really good candidates for purchase but if you already hold them in your portfolio then you should refrain from selling them even if the P/E looks high. Remember, the rules for buying and holding a business aren’t necessarily same. The argument – a stock shouldn’t be held in the portfolio if one wouldn’t buy fresh quantities of it at current prices – is quite convincing but it creates another risk for the investor. The risk of re-investment. Fisher argues –
…the number of truly attractive companies in regard to the first three dimensions is fairly small. Undervalued ones are not easy to find. The risk of making a mistake and switching into one that seems to meet all of the first three dimensions but actually does not is probably considerably greater for the average investor than the temporary risk of staying with a thoroughly sound but currently overvalued situation until genuine value catches up with current prices.
Retaining a high-quality overpriced stock is psychologically difficult so it’s not uncommon for investors to reason that they can sell such overpriced stocks and buy them back once the price returns to reasonable levels. It’s easier said than done because timing the market is a feat impossible to achieve for majority of investors. Fisher warns –
…it is my observation that those who sell such stocks to wait for a more suitable time to buy back these same shares seldom attain their objective. They usually wait for a decline to be bigger than it actually turns out to be. The result is that some years later when this fundamentally strong stock has reached peaks of value considerably higher than the point at which they sold, they have missed all of this later move and may have gone into a situation of considerably inferior intrinsic quality.
The price-earnings ratio of a company isn’t just dependent on Mr. Market’s opinion on the future prospects of the underlying business alone. This is an oversimplification, writes Fisher, “Actually it always results from the blending of three separate appraisals: the current financial-community appraisal of the attractiveness of common stocks as a whole, of the industry of which the particular company is a part, and, finally, of the company itself.
P/E ratio is a useful metric to assess the wider financial community’s opinion about the stock but over-reliance on this ratio can lead to wrong conclusions. It’s just one of the pieces of the larger puzzle called “how to value a business?” Using only the price-earnings ratio to draw a comparison between the attractiveness of two stocks with similar future prospects gives an incomplete picture. Fisher explains –
…let us assume that there are two stocks with an equally strong prospect of doubling earnings over the next four years and that both are selling at twenty times earnings, while in the same market companies which are sound otherwise but have no growth prospects are selling at ten times earnings. Let us suppose that four years later the price-earnings ratios of stocks as a whole are unchanged so that generally sound stocks, but ones with no growth prospects, are still selling at ten times earnings. Let us also suppose that at this same time, four years later, one of our two stocks has much the same growth prospects for the time ahead as it had four years before so that the financial community’s appraisal is that this stock should again double its earnings over the next four years. This means it would still be selling at twenty times the doubled earnings of the past four years, or, in other words, that it had also doubled in price in that period. In contrast, at this same time, four years after our example had started, the second stock had also doubled its earnings, just as had been expected, but at this point the financial community’s appraisal is for flat earnings in an otherwise sound company over the next four years. This would mean that owners of this second stock were in for a market disappointment even though the four-year doubling of earnings had come through exactly as forecast. With an image of “no growth in earnings for the next four years, they would now be seeing a price-earnings ratio of only ten in this second stock. Therefore, while the earnings had doubled, the price of the stock had remained the same.
That’s a brilliant example to showcase how in spite of increased earnings a stock can end up earning zero returns.
Getting hung up on price-earnings ratio has other side effects too. It’s one of the sources of anchoring bias. For example, when the P/E ratio of a stock remains stuck at a value, investors subconsciously attribute the stock’s true value to this price level. The changes in the business fundamental are usually slow and thus easy to miss. Just like the boiling frog syndrome. Getting too focused on quarterly reports makes us blind to the slow and steady change (positive or negative) transpiring in the balance sheet. So the P/E re-rating usually happens like a knee-jerk reaction when the larger financial community one day wakes up from sleep and realizes that the fundamentals of a company have improved or deteriorated significantly.
The fourth dimension of conservative investing might be summarized in this way –
The price of any particular stock at any particular moment is determined by the current financial-community appraisal of the particular company, of the industry it is in, and to some degree of the general level of stock prices. Determining whether at that moment the price of a stock is attractive, unattractive or somewhere in between depends for the most part on the degree these appraisals vary from reality.
Unlike Warren Buffett, Philip Fisher isn’t a name that many people especially the new investors recognize. But that doesn’t, in any way, make Fisher’s investing insights any less useful for new investors. Fisher’s investment classic Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits ranks close to Benjamin Graham’s The Intelligent Investor
I hope this series on Fisher’s insights on conservative investment policy has provided you some useful food for thought.
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